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Abstract: We study the yields in the German treasury bills market. We take a detailed 
look at the yield banks require to buy treasury bills in the primary market, and we also 
examine the yield households and nonbank firms demand to buy these bills in the sec-
ondary market. We use data from real world tenders to show that the bids set by banks 
are in accordance with the predictions of our theoretical framework. In particular, we 
show that current monetary policy and the market’s expectations regarding the future 
path of monetary policy can be used to define an interval in which the bids from banks 
lie. Our theoretical predictions for the secondary market also match the data.
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1. Introduction
German Treasury Bonds are generally considered to be one of the least risky assets available in the 
market. They are therefore a benchmark against which most other investments are compared. In 
particular, investors compare the expected rate of return on a given risky investment to what they 
would obtain if they bought Germany Treasury Bonds instead.
In this paper, we look at the determinants of the interest rate on German Treasury Bills, studying 
in great detail the linkages between this interest rate, interbank interest rates and current and future 
monetary policy.
The issuing of government bonds in the primary market has been widely studied. Several authors 
have examined the relation between the federal funds (FF) interest rate and the T-Bills interest rate 
in the US. These two variables are linked by the expectations hypothesis, with the T-Bills rate being 
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equal to the expected FF rate up to the maturity of the T-Bills plus a risk premium (Sarno & Thornton, 
2002). The study by Cook and Hahn (1989) was one of the first to find that the FF rate had a strong 
effect on T-Bills interest rates in the 1974–79 period. Using a larger sample covering for the 1974–99 
period, Sarno and Thornton (2002) found a long-run relation between these two rates, which re-
mains stable across different monetary policy regimes. Elder (2001) found that positive shocks to 
the FF rate increase T-Bills rates but also lead to an increase in the volatility of T-Bills prices. However, 
the author does not find a relation between the volatility of the FF rate and the risk premiums of 
T-Bills’ returns.
Even though there is an extensive evidence of the FF rate’s effect on T-Bills rates, there is a little 
empirical support for the expectation hypothesis applied to T-Bills. Guidolin and Thornton (2008) 
argue that the failure of the expectation hypothesis is caused by investors’ inability to correctly predict 
short-term rates.
Apart from policy rates, the literature has studied other factors that affect T-Bills rates. Wingenber 
(2011) shows that unexpected changes in the FF rate have a significant effect on risk premiums, and 
that the impact is different for changes made at scheduled or unscheduled FOMC meetings. Fleming 
(2002) looks at the relation between the size of treasury bond issues in the US and their liquidity. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) empirically show that, as expected, yields are smaller for bills with 
higher liquidity. Anderson (1997) uses error correction models to study how transaction costs affect 
yield movements in the primary US treasury bill market. Duffee (1996) studies segmentation in the 
US treasury bill market. Cammack (1991) compares T-Bills auction prices with contemporaneous 
secondary market prices in the US to assess the amount of imperfect information that is present in 
the market. Balduzzi, Elton and Green (2001) examine how the price of government bonds reacts to 
scheduled releases of macroeconomic news in the US. Garbade and Ingber (2005) study how recent 
advances in communications and information-processing technologies have affected the way in 
which auctions are carried out and prices. Carson (1959), Brimmer (1962), Bolten (1973), Boatler 
(1975) and Smith (1996), among others, discuss the treasury bill auction procedures in the US with 
the goal of determining which procedure would maximize government revenues. Nyborg, Rydqvist 
and Sundaresan (2002) examine how the bidders’ behaviour is affected by increased uncertainty at 
the time of bidding in Swedish treasury bond auctions.
In this paper, we focus on the issuing of Treasury Bills (T-Bills) by the German government, making 
two contributions to the literature.
First, we explore the relation between the T-Bills interest rate, interbank interest rates and ECB 
monetary policy. Under normal circumstances, when banks go to an auction where the government 
is to issue short-term bonds 1, they require a similar yield to the return they could obtain by lending 
to other banks in the interbank loans market for the same maturity. This is because in normal times 
(i.e. outside crisis periods), banks regard both investments as relatively safe. In this paper, we try to 
make a more precise estimate of the yields banks require in order to buy short-term German T-Bills 
in the primary market. We do this by considering the whole spectrum of maturities available in the 
interbank loans market and the way monetary policy affects interbank interest rates.
Using the days when treasury bill auctions actually took place, we compared the interest rates 
that banks set in their bids to the rate our framework would predict. To do so, we used Bundesbank 
data on six-month treasury bills auctions and data on interbank loan rates. In all cases, the average 
yield set by banks in the auctions conforms to what our theory predicted.
A second contribution of this paper is to examine the secondary market for German T-Bills and the 
way the interest rate is determined in this market.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 reviews some basic notions about the valuation 
of financial assets. In Section 3, we look at the rationale behind banks’ decisions on the yield they 
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require to be willing to buy German T-Bills in the primary market. Section 4 examines the yield that 
households and nonbank firms demand to buy treasury bills in the secondary market. Section 5 
concludes.
2. General principles
As mentioned above, in this paper, we address two questions: (I) how do banks decide the yield they 
require to be willing to buy German T-Bills in the primary market (i.e. in the auctions where the 
German government first issues the T-Bills); and (II) how do households decide the yield they require 
to be willing to buy German T-Bills in the secondary market (i. e., when they go to a bank to purchase 
these bills).
Before going to the specifics of the two cases, let us recall that, in general, economic agents 
decide on the average rate of return they require to buy a certain security based on the following 
principle.
Each security has certain characteristics related to liquidity, market risk and default risk. By liquid-
ity, we mean the average time and transaction costs involved in selling the security. By market risk, 
we mean the risk that the price of the security could be low if we suddenly needed to sell. By default 
risk, we mean the risk that the issuer of the security may not deliver the payouts.
If, after comparing the liquidity and risk characteristics of two securities (A and B), a certain eco-
nomic agent decides he/she prefers security A to security B, then he/she will only be willing to buy 
security B if the expected rate of return of B is higher. In other words, if:
Expected rate of return of B = Expected rate of return of A + RLP
where RLP denotes a risk and liquidity premium.
3. Primary market: the yield banks require to be willing to buy government bills
Our main goal in this section is to devise a framework to explain the yield banks require to be willing 
to buy German government bills in the primary market. As an example, we will look at bonds with 
face value €10, zero coupon rate and maturity within six months. The German government announces 
today the issuance of 50,000 bonds with these characteristics. A tender is organized in which each 
bank makes a bid, i.e. it indicates the number of bonds it would like to buy and the price it would be 
willing to pay for each bond. The German government then decides which bids it wants to accept (it 
may end up selling less than the 50,000 bonds originally announced).
To determine the price they will set in their bids – i.e. the price they are willing to pay for each bond 
with those characteristics -.banks follow three steps:
Step 1 Estimation of the pay-offs that the bond entitles its owner to receive;
Step 2  Computation of the rate of return it makes sense to require in order to be willing to buy the 
bond (taking into account its risk and liquidity characteristics);
Step 3 Combine steps 1 and 2 to obtain the price.
Note that the answer to Step 2 corresponds to what we are looking for in this section of the 
paper.
Let us then follow the three steps.
3.1. Step 1. Estimate of pay-offs
In Step 1, banks make an estimate of the payments that the bond entitles them to receive. Since 
these are zero-coupon bonds, they only entitle their owner to receive the face value (€10) at maturity 
(see Figure 1):
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3.2. Step 2. Compute the expected annual rate of return banks require
In order to decide the average rate of return they require to buy the bonds, banks will compare 
the bonds’ liquidity and risk characteristics with the liquidity and risk characteristics of alternative high 
liquidity/low risk investments for which they already know the rate of return. These alternative invest-
ments are:
(a) A six-month loan in the interbank market. In this case:
- the liquidity of the application is zero (the funds lent will only be recovered at maturity);
-  market risk is zero (in a loan to another bank, the amount and interest rate involved are set 
at the beginning and so the amount paid out at the end is known from the outset);
-  default risk is low if the investment horizon is only a few months (if a bank is near bank-
ruptcy, we can usually see several months before that this is imminent).
(b)  A succession of overnight loans in the interbank market during the next six months. In this 
case:
- liquidity is high because these are overnight loans;
-  market risk is low, because the overnight interbank rate is linked to the central bank interest 
rate which normally changes smoothly over time;
- default risk is low because a normal bank does not go bankrupt from one day to the next.
(c)  Making deposits in the overnight deposit facility of the central bank – which is possible at least 
in the case of the ECB – during the next six months. In this case:
- liquidity is high because these are overnight deposits;
-  market risk is low, because the central bank normally changes its interest rates smoothly 
over time;
-  default risk is low – almost zero – because if necessary, the central bank can print money to 
pay its debts (the only limit would be the fear of causing inflation through excessive money 
printing).
The rates of return of alternatives (a), (b) and (c) all stem from present and expected central bank 
interest rates.
We next describe the risk and liquidity characteristics of the German T-Bills we are studying:
•  liquidity is high because T-Bills can normally be sold to a bank without much difficulty or 
cost;
•  market risk is low because, if we want to sell before maturity, the amount a bank will pay us 
depends on the alternative application available to this bank for the same funds, i.e. making 
an interbank loan with the same maturity. The interest rate on this interbank loan fluctuates 
very little because it originates from the central bank repo rate which usually evolves in a 
Figure 1. Expected pay-offs of 
the T-Bill.
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stable manner. As a result, it is easy to predict with only small errors the amount one can 
expect to obtain from selling the T-Bill at any date before maturity, i. e. market risk is low;
•  default risk is low because the issuer is the German government.
We are now in a good position to compare the risk and liquidity characteristics of the T-Bills with 
the risk and liquidity characteristics of alternatives (a), (b) and (c)2. In practice, alternative (c) is ig-
nored because it has a much lower rate of return than (a) and (b)—and so banks would not really 
consider it.
We therefore proceed by first comparing the risk and liquidity characteristics of the T-Bills with 
those of alternative (a). In terms of risk of default, they are similar (very low). Their market risk is also 
similar (if held to maturity, the T-Bills have no market risk, and loans to another bank also have 
no market risk). However, there is a big difference in liquidity: T-Bills are very liquid, whereas loans to 
other banks for six months are not liquid at all. This makes it preferable to buy six-month T-Bills – i.e. 
lending to the German government for six months—as opposed to lending to other banks for six 
months. As a consequence, banks will require a lower rate of return for buying the six-month T-Bills 
than the six-month rate available in the interbank money market (IMM). Mathematically:
Secondly, we compare the risk and liquidity features of the T-Bills with the risk and liquidity characteris-
tics of alternative (b). The default risk is very similar and both are very liquid. The major difference lies in 
the market risk. If we hold the T-Bills to maturity, we will receive the face value; if, on the other hand, we 
opt for a succession of loans in the overnight interbank market for six months, there is no guarantee of 
how much we will receive (because the central bank may unexpectedly lower its key rates in the middle 
of the six months, thereby making the interbank overnight rate drop). As a consequence, banks will 
demand a lower rate of return for buying the T-Bills than the rate they would receive by making succes-
sive loans in the overnight interbank market for six months. Mathematically:
The problem with this equation is that the ‘average of the overnight interbank interest rates ex-
pected over the next six months’ cannot be directly observed as it is an expectation. To overcome 
this weakness, we will try to obtain an equation that relates the rate of return banks want on the 
T-Bills to today’s overnight interbank interest rate (a value that can be observed). To do this, we need 
to make assumptions about the banks’ expectations of monetary policy during the next six months.
3.2.1. Scenario A. Banks expect the central bank to keep its reference rates unchanged for 
the next six months
As we know, the interbank overnight interest rate tends to be very close to the main policy rate of 
the central bank. So, if banks expect the central bank rate to remain unchanged over the next six 
months, then the average of the overnight interbank rates expected for the next six months will be 
roughly equal to today’s interbank overnight rate, i.e.
Combining Equation (3) with Equation (2), we conclude that under Scenario A:
3.2.2. Scenario B. Banks expect the central bank to lower its reference rates during the 
next six months
If banks expect the central bank to reduce its reference rates over the next six months, then the 
average of the overnight interbank rates expected for the next six months will be less than today’s 
overnight interbank rate, i.e.
(1)RT−Bills
6M
< R
IMM
6M
(2)RT−Bills
6M < average of overnight interbank interest rates expected over the next 6months
(3)RIMMo∕n = average of overnight interbank interest rates expected over the next 6months
(4)R
T−Bills
6M < R
IMM
o∕n
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Combining Equation (5) with Equation (2), we conclude that under Scenario B:
3.2.3. Scenario C. Banks expect the central bank to increase its reference rates during the 
next six months
If banks expect the central bank to increase its reference rates over the next six months, then the 
average of the overnight interbank rates expected for the next six months will be higher than today’s 
interbank overnight rate, i.e.
The Equations (7) and (2) do not allow us to reach any conclusion about the relationship between 
RT−Bills
6M  and R
IMM
o∕n . However, note that in a world without uncertainty, the only advantage of the six-
month T-Bills over a succession of interbank overnight loans would evaporate (in a world with 100% 
certainty, banks could compute with certainty the amount they would receive by investing succes-
sively in the overnight market for six months). So in a world with 100% certainty, instead of Equation 
(2), we would have:
Combining Equation (7) with Equation (8), we would obtain the following relation between RT−Bills
6M  
and RIMMo∕n :
Thus, under Scenario C, all we can say is: if the uncertainty surrounding economic developments in 
the next six months is low, then Equation (9) probably holds. The more uncertain the environment in 
the next six months is, the more likely it is that this inequality ‘>’ will switch to ‘<’.
3.2.4. Real world examples
Let us now look at some of the auctions that actually took place and see if the rate asked by the banks 
conforms to what our reasoning would predict. In what follows, the data on six-month ‘Bubills’—
Treasury Bills of the Federal Republic of Germany—were kindly supplied by the Bundesbank. The in-
terbank overnight and six-month interest rates were obtained from the site www.global-rates.com.
Example 1: Markets expecting a decrease in central bank rates over the next six months
As a first example, consider the auction made by the German government in July 2001.
During July 2001, the average value of the six-month Euribor rate (six-month interbank rate) was 
4.387%. Equation (1) tells us that:
Between 6 October 2000 and 6 June 2003, the ECB lowered interest rates several times. So, it can 
be argued that in July 2001, we were under Scenario B (markets expecting a decrease in central bank 
rates3). Equation (6) therefore tells us that banks will set their bids, so that:
(5)RIMMo∕n > average of overnight interbank interest rates expected over the next 6months
(6)RT−Bills
6M < R
IMM
o∕n
(7)RIMMo∕n < average of overnight interbank interest rates expected over the next 6months
(8)RT−Bills
6M = average of overnight interbank interest rates expected over the next 6months
(9)RT−Bills6M > R
IMM
o∕n
(10)RT−Bills6M < R
IMM
6M
⇔ R
T−Bills
6M
< 4.387%
RT−Bills
6M < R
IMM
o∕n
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Given that the average Eonia (interbank overnight rate) in July 2001 was 4.505%, we can write the 
previous equation as4:
Combining (10) and (11), we would predict that banks require the following interest rate to be willing 
to buy the Bubills:
In the July 2001 Bubills auction, the average yield was:
In short, the actual average yield in the July 2001 Bubills auction conforms to our prediction.
Example 2: Markets expecting unchanged central bank rates over the next six months
Let us now consider the auction made by the German government in October 2004.
During October 2004, the average value of the six-month Euribor rate (six month interbank rate) 
was 2.191%. Equation (1) tells us that:
From 6 June 2003 until 6 December 2005, the ECB kept its reference rates unchanged. So, we may 
argue that in October 2004, we were under Scenario A (markets expecting no change in central bank 
rates). Equation (4) then tells us that banks will set their bids, so that:
Since in October 2004 the average Eonia (interbank overnight rate) was 2.111%, we can write the 
previous equation as:
Combining (12) and (13), we would predict that the yield banks require to be willing to buy the Bubills 
would be:
In the October 2004 Bubills auction, the average yield was:
In short, the average yield which actually occurred in the October 2004 Bubills auction conforms to 
what our reasoning would predict.
Example 3: Markets expecting an increase in central bank rates over the next six months
As a final example, let us consider the auction made by the German government in January 20075.
During January 2007, the average value of the six-month Euribor rate (six-month interbank rate) 
was 3.890%. Equation (1) tells us that
(11)RT−Bills
6M < 4.505%
RT−Bills
6M < 4.387%
RT−Bills
6M = 4.3%
(12)RT−Bills
6M
< R
IMM
6M
⇔ R
T−Bills
6M
< 2.191%
RT−Bills
6M < R
IMM
o∕n
(13)RT−Bills
6M < 2.111%
RT−Bills
6M < 2.111%
RT−Bills
6M = 2.069%
(14)RT−Bills
6M
< R
IMM
6M
⇔ R
T−Bills
6M
< 3.890%
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From 6 December 2005 until 9 July 2008, the ECB increased interest rates several times. So, it can be 
argued that in January 2007, we were under Scenario C (markets expecting increases in central bank 
rates6). Equation (9) then tells us that banks will probably set their bids, so that
Given that the average Eonia (interbank overnight rate) in January 2007 was 3.563%, we can write 
the previous equation as:
Combining (14) and (15), we would predict that—to be willing to buy the Bubills—banks require a 
rate of return satisfying the following condition:
In the January 2007 Bubills auction, the average yield was:
Once again, the actual average yield in the January 2007 Bubills auction conforms to our prediction.
3.3. Step 3. Combine step 1 and step 2 to obtain the price banks are willing to pay
Combining the expected payment (€10), seen in step 1, with the average rate of return obtained in 
step 2, we obtain the price banks are willing to pay. In Example 1, using 4.3% as the required rate of 
return, that price would be:
Using similar computations, we would arrive at prices for Example 2 and Example 3.
Note that in Step 2 above, we obtained what we were looking for in this section of the article 
(the yield banks require to be willing to buy the T-Bills).
4. Secondary market: the yield households and nonbank firms require to be willing 
to buy T-Bills from the banks
When households and nonbank firms go to a bank to buy T-Bills, a similar reasoning can be used to 
obtain the yield they require (in Step 2).
The only difference is that—from the point of view of households and firms—the alternative to 
buying T-Bills is making saving deposits in banks. This is because households and firms do not have 
access to the interbank loans market.
The risk and liquidity characteristics of saving deposits in banks are:
•  liquidity is high because banks usually raise no objections to the conversion of saving deposits 
into checkable deposits;
•  there is some market risk because if we make this conversion before the dates scheduled for 
interest payments, we will lose part of the interest;
•  default risk is usually small for financially sound banks.
RT−Bills
6M > R
IMM
o∕n
(15)RT−Bills
6M > 3.563%
3.563% < RT−Bills
6M < 3.890%
RT−Bills
6M = 3.716%
10
P
T−Bills
=
(
1 + 0.043
)6∕12
⇔ P
T−Bills =
10
(
1 + 0.043
)6∕12 ⇔ P
T−Bills = 9.79
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On the other hand, as seen above, the risk and liquidity characteristics of the Treasury Bills are:
• liquidity is high because they can easily be sold to a bank;
•  market risk is low (the price of T-Bills does not fluctuate greatly);
•  default risk is low because the issuer is the German government.
In comparing these two alternative investments, households and firms see as the main difference 
the fact that if they decide to withdraw a savings deposit before maturity, the amount initially de-
posited will be received at the least. In the case of T-Bills, if they are sold before maturity, it is pos-
sible, although unlikely, that an investor will receive less than the amount initially paid for the bills. 
This makes households and firms prefer the risk/liquidity combination of savings deposits to that of 
T-Bills. As a consequence:
Remember that the interest rate on savings deposits (RSD
6M) is closely linked to interbank money rates, 
which means it is ultimately determined by current and expected central bank rates.
In order to test our prediction, we looked at the German data on deposits rates and T-Bills from 
January 2003 to November 2007 (this can be considered a period of ‘normality’, since the effects of 
the Subprime financial crisis where still mild during 2007 7). We can see in Figure 2 that the inequality 
(16) was verified, with the T-Bills rate almost always above the deposits rate.
5. Conclusion
This article focused on studying the yield of German Treasury Bills in both the primary and the sec-
ondary markets. We devised a framework to predict what interest rate banks should rationally set in 
their bids when they go to a government bond auction to buy treasury bills. Using data from the 
German government bond auctions, we were able to correctly predict the range in which the bids 
were set. The empirical data for the secondary market also seem to match our predictions.
We believe it would be interesting in further research to try to gauge expectations of future 
monetary policy using surveys of a panel of banks (instead of using the perfect foresight strategy 
we adopted in this article). It would also be fruitful to examine to what extent our theoretical frame-
work—or an adaptation of it—can be used in nonnormal times (such as the periods since the end of 
2007).
(16)R
SD
6M < R
T−Bills
6M
Figure 2. Deposits rate with 
maturity up to 1-year and 
6-months T-Bills yields on the 
secondary market.
Source: Bundesbank.
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Notes
1.   An auction procedure is used to issue Treasury Bills 
of the German Federal Government (‘Bubills’) in the 
primary market. The only institutions allowed to par-
ticipate directly in the auctions are credit institutions, 
securities trading firms and securities trading banks 
that are members of the Bund Issues Auction Group. As 
of May 2014, these institutions were: ABN AMRO Bank 
N.V., Banca IMI S.p.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 
S.A. , Banco Santander S.A., Bankhaus Lampe KG, 
Barclays Bank PLC, Bayerische Landesbank, BHF-Bank 
Aktiengesellschaft, BNP Paribas S.A., Citigroup Global 
Markets Limited, COMMERZBANK Aktiengesellschaft, 
Crédit Agricole Corporate and Investment Bank, Credit 
Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Danske Bank A/S, 
DekaBank Deutsche Girozentrale, DEUTSCHE BANK 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT, DZ BANK AG Deutsche Zentral-
Genossenschaftsbank, Goldman Sachs International 
Bank, HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt AG, ING Bank N.V., 
Jefferies International Limited, J.P. Morgan Securities 
Ltd., Landesbank Baden-Württemberg, Landesbank 
Hessen-Thüringen Girozentrale, Merrill Lynch Interna-
tional, Mizuho International plc, Morgan Stanley & Co. 
International plc, Natixis, Nomura International plc, 
Norddeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, Nordea Bank 
Finland plc, Rabobank International, Scotiabank Europe 
plc, Société Générale S.A., The Royal Bank of Scotland 
plc, Niederlassung Frankfurt, UBS Deutschland AG, and 
UniCredit Bank AG.
2.   The purpose of this comparison is to determine the 
rate of return on the T-Bills that banks will require 
(before they are willing to buy).
3.   The ECB actually decreased rates in August, September 
and November 2001.
4.   The fact that at the time the Euribor was lower than 
the overnight rate signals that markets were expecting 
a decrease.
5.   The first financial markets’ concern about ‘US subprime 
loans’ were seen at the end of February 2007.
6.   The ECB actually increased rates in March and June 2007.
7.   The recession in the US economy started in December 
2007, according to the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating 
Committee.
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